

ISSN 1450-6998 | UDC 930.85(3)(082)

ЗБОРНИК

МАТИЦЕ СРПСКЕ
ЗА КЛАСИЧНЕ СТУДИЈЕ

JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL STUDIES
MATICA SRPSKA

15

НОВИ САД
NOVI SAD
2013

МАТИЦА СРПСКА
ОДЕЉЕЊЕ ЗА КЊИЖЕВНОСТ И ЈЕЗИК

ЗБОРНИК

МАТИЦЕ СРПСКЕ ЗА КЛАСИЧНЕ СТУДИЈЕ
JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL STUDIES MATICA SRPSKA

15

Уреднички тимо

Сима Аврамовић (Београд), Бхарат Гупт (Делхи),
Виктор Каstellани (Денвер), Карл Јоахим Класен (Гетинген),
Ксенија Марицки Гађански (Београд), Емилија Масон (Париз),
Александар Поповић (Београд), Ливио Росети (Перуђа),
Данијела Стефановић (Београд), секретар,
Мирјана Д. Стефановић (Нови Сад), Бојана Шијачки Маневић (Београд)

Editorial Board

Sima Avramović (Belgrade), Victor Castellani (Denver),
Carl Joachim Classen (Göttingen), Bhart Gupt (Delhi),
Ksenija Maricki Gadjanski (Belgrade), Emilia Masson (CNRS Paris),
Aleksandar Popović (Belgrade), Livio Rosetti (Perugia),
Danijela Stefanović (Belgrade), secretary,
Mirjana D. Stefanović (Novi Sad), Bojana Šijački Manević (Belgrade)

Главни и одговорни уредник

Ксенија Марицки Гађански

Editor-in-Chief

Ksenija Maricki Gadjanski

СЛИКА НА КОРИЦАМА – COVER PICTURE

Сребрна шарнирска фибула на корицама потиче из околине Сомбора. Датује се у другу половину 4. века пре нове ере. Нађена је у гробу или остави заједно са три друге сребрне фибуле истог типа и четири нарукнице од сребрног лима. Данас се налази у Природњачком музеју у Бечу. Фибула припада последњој фази развоја шарнирских фибула, тзв. варијанти Чуруг, које су под грчким утицајем израђиване на територији данашње Војводине.

The silver fibula of the “Scharnier” type on the cover was found in the surrounding of Sombor. It is dated to the second half of the 4th century B.C. It was found in a grave or a hoard together with three silver fibulae of the same type and four bracelets of silver sheet. It is now in the Natural History Museum in Vienna. The fibula belongs to the last development phase of “Scharnier” fibulae — the variant Čurug — which was produced under Greek influence in the territory of present day Vojvodina (North Serbia).

Лого — Logo: Dr. Rastko Vasić

Зборник Матице српске за класичне студије излази једном годишње

Уредништво *Зборника Матице српске за класичне студије*
петнаесту књигу закључило је 25. септембра 2013.

Штампање завршено децембра 2013.

За издавача

Доц. др Ђорђе Ђурић,
генерални секретар Матице српске

Стиручни сарадник Одељења
Јулкица Ђукић

Лектура и коректура
Татјана Пивнички Дринић

Технички уредник
Вукица Туцаков

Компјутерски слоџ
Владимир Ватић, ГРАФИТ, Нови Сад

Штампа
САЈНОС, Нови Сад

Министарство за науку и технолошки развој Републике Србије
учествовало је у финансирању штампања овог *Зборника*

Уредништво и администрација:
21000 Нови Сад, Улица Матице српске 1, телефон: 021/420–199

Editorial and publishing office:
21000 Novi Sad, Matice srpske 1, Serbia

e-mail: zmsks@maticasrpska.org.rs
gadjans@eunet.rs

CIP – Каталогизација у публикацији
Библиотека Матице српске, Нови Сад
930.85(3)(082)

ЗБОРНИК Матице српске за класичне студије =
Journal of classical studies Matica srpska / главни и одговор-
ни уредник Ксенија Марицки Гађански. – 1998, 1–. – Нови
Сад : Матица српска, Одељење за књижевност и језик,
1998–. – 24 cm

Годишње.

ISSN 1450–6998

COBISS.SR-ID 135172871

С А Д Р Ж А Ј
C O N T E N T

СТУДИЈЕ И ЧЛАНЦИ
STUDIES AND ARTICLES

Жика Бујуклић (Београд), „ <i>Laudatio Turiae</i> “ – <i>fons iuris cognoscendi</i> . Žika Vučklić, “ <i>Laudatio Turiae</i> ” – <i>fons iuris cognoscendi</i>	7
Danijela Stefanović (Београд), <i>The Middle Kingdom Statuettes London</i> <i>BM, EA 36441 and EA 32190</i>	35
Данијела Стефановић, <i>Две сџаиуеџе Средњеџ царсџва: Бриџански</i> <i>музеј (Лондон) EA 36441 и EA 32190</i>	
Ненад Марковић (Београд), <i>Кулџ свеџоџ бика Аџиса у динасџичком</i> <i>Еџиџџу</i>	41
Nenad Marković, <i>The Cult of the Sacred Bull Apis in Dynastic Egypt</i>	
Victor Castellani (Denver), <i>Zeus left his wits intact: Irony and Reverence</i> <i>in the Iliad</i>	65
Victor Castellani, <i>Zeus liess dessen Verstand wohl und gesund!: Gastfreund-</i> <i>lichkeit und Ehrfurcht im 6. Gesang der Ilias</i>	
Igor Javor (Novi Sad), <i>O izvesnim pitanjima autorstva Heraklovog štita</i> . Igor Javor, <i>On Certain Questions of the Authorship of The Shield of Herakles</i>	89
Иван Јордовић (Нови Сад), <i>Vita activa и Vita contemplativa у Плаџо-</i> <i>новом дијалоџу Горгија</i>	107
Ivan Jordović, <i>Vita activa and Vita contemplativa in Plato’s dialogue</i> <i>Gorgias</i>	
Самир Аличић (Нови Сад), <i>Једна забава у Шџанији са џраџичним</i> <i>исходом и џроблем имовинске џџеџе у случају убисџва сло-</i> <i>бодноџ човека у римском џраву (CO.I.11)</i>	119
Samir Aličić, <i>A party in Spain with tragic consequences and the problem</i> <i>of property damage in case of murder of a free man in Roman law</i> <i>(CO.I.11)</i>	

- Мира Ружић (Београд), *Кулџ Меркура и Венере у Горњој Мезију . .* 135
 Mira Ružić, *The Cult Of Mercury and Venus in Moesia Superior*

РЕЦЕПЦИЈА АНТИКЕ И НАСЛЕЂЕ
 HERITAGE

- Evangelos D. Protopapadakis (Athens), *From Conceivability to Existance and then to Ethics: Parmenides' Being, Anselm's God and Spinoza's Rejection of Evil* 149
 Evangelos Protopapadakis, *Par l'esprit à l'existence et puis à l'éthique: L'être de Parménide, le Dieu d'Anselme et le rejet du mal par Spinoza*
- М. Mantzanas (Athens), *Soul and Transanimation: Orphics, Pythagoreans, Plato and the Eastern Christian Orthodox Tradition* 157
 М. Mantzanas, *ΨΥΧΗ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΤΕΜΨΥΧΩΣΗ: ΟΡΦΙΚΟΙ, ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΕΙΟΙ, ΠΛΑΤΩΝ ΚΑΙ Η ΑΝΑΤΟΛΙΚΗ ΧΡΙΣΤΙΑΝΙΚΗ ΟΡΘΟΔΟΞΗ ΠΑΡΑΔΟΣΗ*
- Бојана Б. Племић (Београд), *Традиционализам античких мотива у рановизантијској уметности: Venatio у програму јодног мозаика јужне базилике Царичиног града* 179
 Bojana B. Plemić, *Early Byzantine Traditionalism of Antique Motives: Venatio Scenes in the Iconography of a Floor Mosaic from the South Basilica in Caričin grad*
- Александар Д. Јовановић (Београд), *Опис и именовање Турака у Историји Георгџија Акрополиса* 189
 Aleksandar D. Jovanović, *Naming And Describing The Turks In The History By Georgios Acropolites*

ХРОНИКА
 CHRONICLE

- Драгољуб Марјановић (Београд), *Свети цар Констинтин и хришћанство, Ниш 31. 5 – 2. 6. 2013.* 213
 Ирена Љубомировић (Ниш), *CONSTANTINE, IN HOC SIGNO VINCES 313–2013, Ниш и Византија XII, Ниш, 3–6. јун 2013.* 216
 Evangelos D. Protopapadakis, Kalomoira Sakellaraki (Greece), *XXIII WORLD CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. Philosophy as Inquiry and Way of Life, Athens 4–10 August 2013* 219
 Snežana Ferjančić (Beograd), *Peti međunarodni kongres o crnomorskim starinama, Beograd 17–21. 9. 2013. godine* 223

IN MEMORIAM

Војин Недељковић, <i>Радмила Шалабалић (1927–2011)</i>	229
Мирко Обрадовић, <i>Слободан Душанић (1939–2012)</i>	231
Основна упутства сарадницима	239
Рецензенти	241

Evangelos D. Protopapadakis

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

eprotopa@ppp.uoa.gr

FROM CONCEIVABILITY TO EXISTENCE
AND THEN TO ETHICS: PARMENIDES' BEING,
ANSELM'S GOD AND SPINOZA'S
REJECTION OF EVIL¹

ABSTRACT: Classical Greek philosophy in its struggle to grasp the material world from its very beginning has been marked by the – sometimes undercurrent, some others overt and even intense, but never idle – juxtaposition between the mind and the senses, *logos* and perception or, if the anachronism is allowed, between realism and idealism. Parmenides is reportedly the first philosopher to insistently assert that thought and being are the same by his famous aphorism *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶ τε καὶ εἶναι*, and that the “way of truth”, as opposed to the “way of opinion”, only runs through the intellect, since the truth is unattainable by the illusory senses. Thus, true may be only what our intellect can firmly grasp, and – by an easy, though not equally sound step – vice versa: that which our intellect can firmly grasp is necessarily true. In this paper I intend to set off Parmenides' apparent influence on Anselm with regard to the latter's celebrated ontological argument concerning the existence of God, and the influence of both on Spinoza's *Ethica*, which is founded on the key tenet that not only does God necessarily exist – since God is intellectually conceivable –, but that God also by necessity is an utterly good one.

KEY WORDS: Parmenides, Anselm, Spinoza, ontological argument, ethics, paradox of evil.

The paradox of evil is the most eloquent testimony for a long standing dispute in philosophy: the one that concerns the supremacy of the mind over the senses and vice versa. This is mostly because the senses bear unshakable witness for the existence or, moreover, for the predom-

¹ Paper presented at the October 2012 Classical Conference in Belgrade.

inance of evil. To the mind, however, the existence of evil can be nothing more than an absurdity, insofar as one presumes an almighty and benevolent God. This is the so called *riddle of evil* which is – probably falsely – attributed to Epicure by Lactantius and reproduced by David Hume²: “Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?”³ These apparent juxtapositions gain particular weight when they engage the mind of religious philosophers. In such a case, the more brilliant and daring a philosopher is, the more innovative his or her efforts to solve the riddle are, and the more unanticipated the proposed solution is. Spinoza admittedly showed his fair share in boldness and insight when he altogether rejected evil on grounds of its being logically inconsistent and intellectually incomprehensible; however, he would have been less facilitated in his approach if not for Anselm and, long before him, Parmenides of Elea. In this short essay I will try to investigate the influence of Anselm’s thought on Spinoza, and the decisive impact of Parmenides on both. As for the latter in particular, in my opinion his influence far exceeds the predominance of the mind over the senses; Parmenides’ distinction between the so called “way of truth” and the “way of opinion” seems to have reached Spinoza through Moses ben Maimon and decisively affected his geometric mode of reasoning.

It was with Parmenides that metaphysics for the first time totally abandoned its mythological background and *doxa* or common belief, and sought sound foundation in logic.⁴ Parmenides’ views, only fragmentary preserved in his large poem *On Nature*, were to initiate an extremely vigorous tradition; they were so much influential, that they can be easily detected in the views of scholars that lived even two thousand years after his death: Anselm in his so-called ontological argument concerning the existence of God, Descartes in his proofs, as well as in his fixation in what he referred to as clear and distinct ideas, Malebranche in his arguments on pain and Leibniz in his best possible world views more or less seem to be based upon the very same tenets Parmenides introduced. It is in Spinoza’s *Ethics*, however, that Parmenides’ influence in modern philosophy becomes vividly manifest. The cornerstone of Parmenides metaphysics is that what actually exists can only be grasped by virtue

² David Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: The Posthumous Essays of the Immortality of the Soul and of Suicide*, edited by Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis-Cambridge: Hackett Pub Co, 1998), 63.

³ Lactantius, *A Treatise on the Anger of God*, translated by Robert Eustace (New York: Kessinger Publishing, 2004), 24.

⁴ Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), 48.

of the intellect, and by no means by the senses. The intellect is determined by the rigid rules of logic, by laws and principles that a philosopher has to respect and abide by. In case one does, according to Parmenides, he or she is safely traveling down the way of truth. In any other case, the reckless philosopher is only exploring the way of opinion, like ordinary people usually tend to do.⁵

The logical principle of the greatest and most fundamental importance for Parmenides' metaphysics is the one concerning the avoidance of logical – and for him, also ontological – inconsistency or *contradictio in adjecto* with regard to the being: what is necessarily is, and what is not necessarily is not. What is could not be not, and what is not could not be; if one thinks otherwise, he or she just falls prey to a logical fallacy allowed only to those who lack the ability to judge, the ones Parmenides refers to as thoughtless people or *ἄκριτα φῦλα*.⁶ All the more so, this is true because one could not have even the slightest idea of – or speak about what – is not, for what is not could not be accessible to thought.⁷ As Burnet puts it: “There can be no thought corresponding to a name that is not the name of something real.”⁸ Therefore, everything we have the concept of, should necessarily somehow exist. Or, in Parmenides words, the concept of something and the actual object of this concept are the same and equally existing, for one can not find a concept without an actually existing object. Hence, thinking and being are the same – *τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶ τε καὶ εἶναι*.⁹ By these Parmenides seems to imply on the one hand that the true essence of the being is accessible to pure reasoning and abstract meditation, and on the other that what is accessible to pure reasoning and abstract meditation can only exist. In other words, if something exists, the intellect can grasp its essence. And, vice versa, if you can intellectually grasp the essence of something, this should be also existing in reality, for “when you think, you think of something;

⁵ “δισσὴν τε ἔφη τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὴν μὲν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ δόξαν”, DL IX, 22; “and he says philosophy is twofold; one follows down to the truth, the other to opinion”, *Diogenes Laertius' Life of Parmenides, A New Translation with text and Commentary* by E. H. Campbell (Aspen: Edward Campbell Media, 2011).

⁶ “οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοὶ τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα, οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτόν νενόμισται καὶ ταῦτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.” Simplicius, *In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria*, edited by H. Diels, (Berlin: Reimer, 1895); “But just as they are perpetually young, blind, and dazzled like a disorderly tribe—to whom it is customary for a thing to come to be this and not to be this, and everything is a winding road.”, E. H. Campbell, *The Poem of Parmenides* (Bozeman, MT: Inopibus Press).

⁷ “οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τὸ γε μὴ ἔδον (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν) οὔτε φράσαις”, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, edited by H. Diels and W. Kranz, vol. 1, 6th edition (Berlin: Weidmann, 1951), B, 2–3; “Thou canst not know what is not – that is impossible – nor utter it” (Burnet's translation, see below).

⁸ John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 3rd edition (London: A & C Black Ltd, 1920), 85 n24.

⁹ DK B, 2–3.

when you use a name, you use the name of something. Therefore, both thought and language require objects outside themselves.”¹⁰ Or, also in Russell’s words, “if language is not just nonsense, words must mean something, and in general they must not just mean other words, but something that is there whether we talk of it or not.”¹¹ In its second interpretation – namely the one that assumes that if you can think of something, then this must necessarily be an existing something – Parmenides approach became the foundation for Anselm’s ontological argument concerning the existence of God; in its first form, the one that presumes that if something exists, then its true essence may be unveiled only by the intellect, it became the doctrine that runs throughout Spinoza’s thought.

But let us stay a bit more on Parmenides’ so-called *way of truth*: at the end of the road one shall find out not only that the true essence of the being may be unveiled by logic, but also what exactly this true essence is about, as well as what its attributes are. Hence, from the presumption that what is can only be, and that which is not can not be, Parmenides easily moves to the conclusion that what is has always been and will always be in the future, and what is not has never existed and can never exist. This, no matter how absurd it may seem to us humans, given that our life has at some point started and will at some point end, to Parmenides is mandated by logic. Coming into being from not-being is impossible, since not-being is nothing, and from nothing something couldn’t ever be produced. For the same reasons, moving from being into not-being is equally incongruous. Therefore, what actually is, may only be eternal and indestructible. Furthermore, what is can only be motionless, for movement means occupying formerly vacant space. Vacant space, however, belongs to not-being, to wit to nothing; hence the existence of vacant space is logically inconsistent, and so is the possibility of motion. What renders Parmenides, however, the spiritual forefather of Spinoza, is his conviction, also grounded on abstract reasoning, that there can be no multitude of beings, but only one being: if there were many beings, they should be distinguished by virtue of either their being, or their not-being; but being unifies everything, and not-being simply does not exist. Therefore, there can only be one being: *ἀγένητον ἔδν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐλομελές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἡδ’ ἀτέλεστον· οὐδέ ποτ’ ἦν οὐδ’ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἓν, συνεχές*.¹² Spinoza actually says nothing essentially different when he argues that if another substance apart from God existed, it could only be explained by one of God’s attributes,

¹⁰ Russell, 49

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 50

¹² “In it are very many tokens that what is, is uncreated and indestructible, alone, complete, immovable and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all at once, a continuous one.” [Burnet’s translation, see above].

therefore it would necessarily partake of God's essence, and hence be identical to God. Here we are: we have finally come to know the pure essence of the being. And this we achieved without having to resort to the deceitful and misleading senses. The veil of ignorance may be removed only by virtue of the intellect.

Anselm's argument concerning the existence of God is based upon the very same theoretical foundations as Parmenides' approach, namely that: a. true knowledge is only possible through abstract meditation, b. logical and ontological relations coincide and, c. thinking and being are the same. In Anselm's view God exists only because we can intellectually grasp the idea of a supreme being, because God, as Russell points out, is by definition the greater object of human intellect.¹³ Such a being should also exist, because if it didn't, then another one, as great as the former – or even less – but real, would be the greater object of human intellect. In other words, supremacy – or greatness – entails existence. And why is this so? Only because something non-existing cannot be as great as something existing; to wit, if God didn't exist, the human mind would have been occupied by the idea of a maybe lesser, but more real greatest object. Since, however, the greatest of all beings we can think of is by definition God, God should also exist. In short, God exists because we can think of a supreme being, which necessarily exists, since otherwise we wouldn't be able to think of it – and instead we would be thinking of something else; this supreme being can only be God by definition. It is mandated by logic – as it is also mandatory *to* logic – that God exists as the greatest object of (and in) our intellect. If Anselm was right, he would have probably been credited with discovering the Holy Grail of philosophy; for I think there is no philosopher, especially among those who take fancy in metaphysics and ontology, who wouldn't be mesmerized by the idea that whatever he or she thinks of, actually comes – or is – into existence outside his or her thought, and this only because he or she thinks of it. The reverse, however, seems much more promising: nothing that is logically inconsistent or unintelligible may be allowed to exist in reality. To Spinoza the ultimate logical absurdity is the presumption of an interested God, to wit of a God that could be good or evil, either *per se* or towards humans.

Spinoza was in apparent contradiction with common sense and everyday experience when he rejected the very existence of evil – as well as that of good – on grounds of abstract meditation alone. To him evil – exactly as good – could be nothing else than mere modes or modifications of the same reality, which is the way it is by a divine necessity entirely transparent to the senses and gross meditation, and accessible

¹³ Russell, 417–418.

only to the sublimity of reason. In Spinoza's technical language, evil and good are just distinct ways we humans perceive, understand and describe the only possible – and thus, logically necessary, reality. “We neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it.”¹⁴ Good and evil are only subjective interpretations of reality, *flatus vocis* in the terminology of Roscelin of Compiègne, deprived of any metaphysical or ontological foundations.¹⁵ And this is not due to some religious tenacity on behalf of Spinoza, but only due to what in his opinion is mandatory by reason.

Spinoza, unlike Anselm and Descartes, turned to the ontological argument to prove not that there is *at least one*, but that there is *only one* substance, God. “Except God no substance can be granted or conceived”¹⁶ – therefore, “whatever is, is in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God”¹⁷. Let us notice the parataxis of the terms “exist” and “be conceived”, by which Spinoza denotes that the reality and the conception of it coincide in such a way, that the relations among ideas precisely correspond to relations in reality.¹⁸ It follows that relations or dependencies between beings can be interpreted as logical relations between distinct ideas. Under this scope the technical – in Spinoza's vocabulary – terms “be conceived”, “be” and “be in”, become much more clear: when he argues that “whatever is, is in God”, Spinoza means that the idea of any other being is logically dependent on the idea of God, in such a way that God is the explanation of any other being, exactly in the way a mathematical proof is dependent on its premises. In other words, without God no being could exist in our mind and, therefore, in reality, exactly as a club would not exist without its members, according to Scruton's allegory: we believe that the members of the club are *in* the club, but in Spinoza's technical language *the club* is in its members.¹⁹ Let us, however, return to God: if everything else is logically dependent on God, then it is also ontologically dependent on him. In other words, its explanation is *in* God. If so, however, Spinoza's universe allows for only one substance, God, since in Spinoza's mind and terminology a substance is “that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, that the conception

¹⁴ Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics*, translated by Edwin Curley (New York: Penguin Classics, 2005), III, P9, S.

¹⁵ “Illi utique dialectici, qui non nisi flatum vocis putant universalis esse substantias...”, Anselm, *De Incarnatione Verbi*, p. 285. Opera Omnia, vol. 1. Edited by F. S. Schmitt, 1938.

¹⁶ Spinoza, I, P14.

¹⁷ Ibid., P15.

¹⁸ Roger Scruton, *Spinoza: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 39

¹⁹ Scruton, 40.

of which does not require the conception of some other thing”²⁰. This substance may have attributes and modes. These can not be conceived through themselves, but only as inherent in a substance. If, then, the conception of everything else is dependent upon God, it follows that there can be no other substance except God. This absurdity, apparently hostile to common experience, in Spinoza’s view is only a logical prerequisite. This is because to him God can only be defined as “a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence”²¹. God “exists by necessity”, since if this wasn’t so, we should have to conceive of a substance whose essence wouldn’t entail existence, which is however absurd, since a substance may only be *causa sui*²² and, therefore, its essence “necessarily entails existence, to wit it is in its nature to exist”²³. God shall necessarily exist unless prevented. But God can not be prevented, therefore God necessarily exists.²⁴ If there was some other substance except God, it should be explained through some attribute of God. In such a case there would exist two substances to which the same attribute would inhere, which is absurd: these allegedly co-existing substances would either be of the same kind, or of different.²⁵ For Spinoza, however, we can *a priori* explain the existence of only one substance of a kind, but not of more than one. Therefore, the other-than-God substance should not be of God’s kind. In this case, though, this substance would be less perfect than God, since God is by definition the most perfect being, therefore it would owe its existence to God; in other words, God would be its ultimate explanation. In Spinoza’s terminology, this substance would be *in* God, therefore it would be no substance at all, but rather an attribute or mode of God.

Like Parmenides, Spinoza argues that all beings are one: *εν το παν*. The multitude of beings our senses testify for is nothing else than the modes or attributes of God, together with every one of the numerous conditions or situations a human may find him or herself in: war, genocide, famine, what we in general call evil, is nothing else than modes of God as necessary as any other. These untoward situations are no more wrong than they are right, no more evil than they are good. They are just necessary. Only those whom Parmenides refers to as *ἀκριτα φύλα*, those that have surrendered themselves to the language of man, according to

²⁰ Spinoza, I, D3.

²¹ Ibid., D3.

²² “By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.” Ibid., D1.

²³ Ibid., D7.

²⁴ Scruton, 45.

²⁵ Sherry Deveaux, “The Divine Essence and the Conception of God in Spinoza”, *Synthese* 135.3 (2003): 329–338, especially 334–335.

Moses ben Maimon, the ones that thoughtlessly travel on the way of opinion, may believe in good and evil situations or things. Arguing that something is evil, one implies that it should be otherwise and, hence, that God could be otherwise. But this one is the greatest of all absurdities: God could be no different, because God is the way he is by logical necessity. Given this, if things could be different, this would only be due to the existence of some other substance, which, however, is logically incomprehensible and inconsistent, as we saw before. It is quite clear that Spinoza's world has no room for duality, not to speak for pluralism. Admittedly Spinoza's vision of the world contradicts common experience no less than that of Parmenides. If this is so, Parmenides and Spinoza would promptly agree, so much the worse for common experience.

Evangelos D. Protopapadakis

Université d'Athènes
eprotopa@ppp.uoa.gr

PAR L'ESPRIT À L'EXISTENCE ET PUIS À L'ÉTHIQUE:
L'ÊTRE DE PARMÉNIDE, LE DIEU D'ANSELME
ET LE REJET DU MAL PAR SPINOZA.

Résumé

La philosophie Grecque classique de son premier pas à sa lutte à comprendre le monde matériel a été marquée par la contradiction – quelques fois couverte et quelques autres apparente et même intense, mais jamais vaine, – entre l'esprit et les sens, entre le logos et la perception ou, si l'anachronisme est permis, entre le réalisme et l'idéalisme. Parménide est le premier philosophe mentionné qui soutient avec insistance que la réflexion et l'être sont le même avec son aphorisme bien connu “τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστὶ τε καὶ εἶναι” et que “la rue de la vérité”, qui est opposée à “la rue de l'opinion”, passe seulement à travers l'esprit, comme la vérité est inintelligible par les sens illusoire. Ainsi ce que l'entendement humain peut fermement concevoir pourrait seulement être vrai, et – par un pas facile mais pas également éclatant, vice versa: ce que l'entendement humain peut fermement concevoir est obligatoirement vrai. Dans cette épreuve j'ai l'intention à montrer le clair influence de Parménide à Anselme par rapport à l'argument ontologique renommé d'Anselme qui concerne l'existence du Dieu, et l'influence de tous les deux à l'*Ethica* de Spinoza, qui se base sur le principe central que Dieu pas seulement existe nécessairement – comme Dieu est concevable par l'esprit – mais aussi qu'il est par nécessité un tout à fait bon Dieu.

